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Abstract:  
 
 
international financial centre (IFC). However, Brexit does create opportunities for alternative financial 
centres located inside the remaining EU member states. In this article, we assess the strategic 
positioning of private and public actors within two European IFCs - Frankfurt and Paris - in the period 
following the Brexit vote. Agents within these centres are seeking to differentially benefit from Brexit 
 vulnerable financial sub-sectors  
regulatory reforms. In light of these findings we argue that existing approaches to financial centre 
relations - - should engage with the ways in 
which political actors shape European financial relations. Whilst private actors inside financial 
it, new 
competitive orientations are also in evidence as political actors seek to privilege their territories 
relative to rival spaces.   
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Abstract   
opportunities for alternative financial centres located inside the remaining EU member 
states. In this article, we assess the strategic positioning of private and public actors 
within two European IFCs - Frankfurt and Paris - in the period following the Brexit 
vote. Agents within these centres are seeking to differentially benefit from Brexit in two 
 vulnerable financial sub-
sectors  away from the City and by 
domestic and European regulatory reforms. In light of these findings we argue that 
existing approaches to financial centre relations - in particular 
- should engage with the ways in which political actors shape 
European financial relations
and regulatory convergence after Brexit, new 
competitive orientations are also in evidence as political actors seek to privilege their 
territories relative to rival spaces.   
  
Introduction  
Brexit is likely to produce a marked reconfiguration in relations between the City of London and the 
its access to the European Single Market, alternative international financial centres (IFCs) within EU 
member states are potentially well-positioned to benefit from Brexit. By May 2017, a quarter of 
financial services firms in the UK  including international banks such as HSBC, Standard Chartered 
and JP Morgan  were in the process of moving thousands of workers out of the City and into EU 
member states (EY, 2017a). In contrast, voices from within Frankfurt, Paris and Dublin positioned 
ational banks and 
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asset management firms (Lavery et al., 2017). A reconfiguration of European financial centre 
relations is taking place in the aftermath of the Brexit vote.  
Within economic geography, the principal attempt to conceptualise and empirically 
centre relations has come from scholars working within 
research network. GaWC researchers argue that globalisation generates new forms of connectivity, 
complementarity and collaboration between IFCs (Beaverstock et al, 2000; Taylor at al, 2002; Taylor, 
2000; 2004). In the 2000s, a number of GaWC researchers applied this framework in order to analyse 
relations between the City of London and Frankfurt under the new European single currency 
(Beaverstock et al., 2001; 2005; Faulconbridge, 2004). Their central argument was that relations 
Functional specialisation 
and intra-firm coordination generated a complementarity between Frankfurt and the City of London. 
Cooperative rather than competitive relations prevailed.  
There is much to commend in GaWC research. It has outlined in extensive empirical detail how cities, 
firms and IFCs become increasingly co-dependent under conditions of globalisation. That said, we 
argue that GaWC research is also marked by three blind spots which lead it to understate the 
competitive relations which exist between European IFCs. These include its firm-centric 
methodological approach and its consequent neglect of political agency; its tendency to conceive of 
regulatory harmonisation as a functional-economic as opposed to inherently political process; and its 
empirical focus on relations between the City of London and European IFCs rather than on the 
relations between continental European financial centres themselves.    
The article makes two principal contributions to the existing literature. Empirically, we advance an 
analysis of the strategic positioning of private and public sector agents within two leading European 
IFCs - Frankfurt and Paris - in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. Drawing on research where we 
translated, coded and analysed over 300 French and German language policy documents, we argue 
that private and public agents within Frankfurt and Paris 
key respects. First, they are seeking to capture  vulnerable financial sub-sectors  
away from the City of London and into their own respective jurisdictions. Second, some financial and 
secure pro-business regulatory reform at both the national and European levels. Conceptually, we 
argue that Brexit and the emerging geographies of competition between European IFCs calls for a re-
assessment of GaWC research 
of the UK from the Single Market which generates new regulatory barriers. A renewed focus on the 
form a central component of future empirical enquiry. 
The article is structured as follows. The first section argues that whilst GaWC research generated 
numerous valuable insights into financial centre relations and globalisation, it is also limited by three 
blind spots. The second section outlines how Brexit unsettles the regulatory status quo and 
competition . The third and fourth sections 
then review the strategic positioning of private and public actors within Frankfurt and Paris since the 
domestic and European regulatory reform. The final section outlines the implications of the analysis 
for the broader economic geography literature on financial centre relations, globalisation and the 
political economy of European finance in the post-crisis conjuncture.     
1. World Cities, globalisation and European financial centres: cooperative or 
competitive relations?   
-  (Ohmae, 1999), increased transnational 
integration from the 1980s onwards did not facilitate an equitable diffusion of economic activity 
across advanced capitalist societies. Instead, globalisation generated new patterns of spatial 
 key nodal points within this 
liberalising global order (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 2011). International banks and specialised 
corporate legal and accounting services firms clustered within and drove the expansion of urban 
centres within the advanced capitalist world (Bassens & Van Meeteren, 2015, p. 757; Sassen, 2011). 
whether globalisation was producing a reconfiguration of power relations between urban centres 
 urban spaces (Smith, 2014, p. 102). 
entrench their own advantage and to restrict the economic capabilities of rival urban spaces (Allen, 
2010).  
In contrast, GaWC research  associated with Peter Taylor, the GaWC research centre at 
Loughborough University 
global cities  tween global cities and 
IFCs was misplaced (Derudder, 2008; GaWC, 2017; Parnreiter, 2014; Taylor, 2004). GaWC research 
instead emphasised the connections and flows between world cities and the ways in which these 
 collaboration between private sector agents (Taylor, 2004). 
Manuel Castells (Castells, 1996; see, for example: Taylor et al., 2002, p. 2377; 2014, p. 281), GaWC 
research mapped in extensive empirical detail the emergent geography of financial centre 
complementarity and cohesion in an era of globalisation.   
Between 2000 and 2005, a group of GaWC researchers assessed the emerging relation between the 
City of London and Frankfurt after the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) (Beaverstock et al., 2000; Beaverstock et al., 2001; Beaverstock et al., 2005; Faulconbridge, 
2004; Taylor et al., 2003). There had in this period been a widespread expectation that the 
introduction of the euro would strengthen the position of Frankfurt relative to London, insofar as 
the former enjoyed close proximity to the newly formed European Central Bank (ECB) and was 
embedded within a powerful eurozone state (Cassis, 2006, p. 271). However, the creation of the euro 
European financial capitalism. Instead, as GaWC scholars demonstrated, relations between these two 
European financial centres exemplified the cooperative rather than competitive character of relations 
between IFCs (Beaverstock et al., 2001; Faulconbridge, 2004).  
A number of mechanisms underpinned these intra-European complementarities and co-dependencies. 
Despite the UK sitting outside the single currency, the City developed extensive trading systems in 
euros (Faulconbridge, 2004). This meant that the City could benefit from the emergence of the 
production also meant that it continued to draw in highly skilled international workers and global 
allowed Frankfurt to import services and capital from the City whilst simultaneously acting as a 
pivotal European link for UK-
two IFCs (Beaverstock et al., 2001, p. 32). This deepened a functional differentiation between the 
City and Frankfurt, with the f
exchange and bond trading and the latter focussing on supplying credit to localised and regional 
European markets (Faulconbridge, 2004, p. 242; see also: , 2013). In addition, 
(Faulconbridge, 2004, p. 241; see also: Buller & Lindstrom, 2013; Quaglia, 2016). As a result of these 
strengthening  
In the end, GaWC research on Frankfurt-London relations after the establishment of EMU robustly 
countered the idea that these financial centres were involved in a remorseless, zero-sum competition 
with one another. Functional specialisation and organisational coordination within firms gave rise to 
ts within these IFCs. These case studies were also 
emblematic of the 
 but rather should be 
thought of in relational terms; that is in terms of the connectivity which cities enjoy relative to other 
urban spaces.  
The GaWC literature has, of course, grown considerably since this earlier period (Derudder & 
Parnreiter, 2014; Taylor et al, 2014; Bassens and Meeteren, 2015; Pan et al., 2016; Hanssens et al., 
2013; , 2013; Coe et al, 2014). However  and despite its achievements in advancing a 
relational account of world cities  GaWC research exhibited then and in our view continues to 
exhibit today a number of blind spots which limit its explanatory potential.1 
The first blind spot of GaWC research stems from its explicitly firm-centric ontology and 
methodology. 
, p. 233).  
producer services offices is not sustained or organised primarily by states or by cities. Instead, firms 
he world city network. As Taylor puts it, the 
economic
2001, p. 182). Subsequent iterations of GaWC research continue to analytically privilege firm 
relations methodologically in this way. For example, Christof Parnreiter in a recent paper notes that 
- . This, he argues, justifies an 
  (Parnreiter, 2014, p. 400). 
 the prevailing method of 
network analysis used in GaWC research to map the connectivity between world cities - is based on 
the global network of offices of advanced producer service firms (Derudder & Taylor, 2016, p. 626). 
In a recent appraisal, researchers associated with GaWC concede that the approach has been largely 
producer servi (van Meeteren et al., 2016, p. 250; Taylor et al, 2014, p. 275).  
sector firms within IFCs from the broader political contexts within which these relations are 
embedded. As Sarah Hall notes, the bulk of extant IFC research in economic geography, including 
research
of the socio-spatial practices of advanced producer service firms (including finance and law firms in 
the conditions under which these financial networks can develo (Hall, 2017, p. 490)  The 
firm-centrism of GaWC research does illuminate the deep connections which link together advanced 
risks neglecting the ways in which the 
production of IFCs rests upon a combination and political power.2  
Political agents at the urban, national and trans-national scales play a critical role in shaping the 
conditions in which IFCs and their associated networks develop. Urban policymakers have an 
incentive to facilitate financial centre development within their own territories in order to increase 
high value economic activities, employment and tax revenues. Similarly, political agents within 
national states play a key role in inducing financial activity into their territories, whether through 
endorsing deregulatory reforms or through adopting monetary policies which are accommodative to 
the needs of global finance (Green & Lavery, 2017; Hall, 2017). In line with growing calls from 
within economic geography , we submit that GaWC research 
inter-
relation  on the other.  
Second, GaWC research has tended to overlook the ways in which regulatory harmonisation between 
national states is an inherently political process. The increasing convergence of transnational 
regulation was viewed by GaWC researchers as a central element of globalisation. This process 
eroded the significance of national boundaries in the locational strategies of advanced service firms. 
For example, 
-national agreements on regulation and financial 
(Faulconbridge, 2004, p. 237). The 
erosion of divergent national regulatory standards directly relates to the increased importance of 
which is so central to GaWC research. As transnational regulatory 
space becomes increasingly homogenised, the ability to 
comparative advantage for advanced service firms. This premise profoundly shaped empirical work 
conducted by GaWC researchers. For example, in the Frankfurt-London case study outlined above, 
Beaverstock and his collaborators note that:  
becoming more blurred and less relevant, suggesting that the processes driving 
future relations between London and Frankfurt will be less defined. Increasingly 
national borders are seen as less significant to business flows than inter-city 
connections. 
(Beaverstock et al., 2001, p. 38) 
As this suggests, GaWC research points to the expansion of the European Single Market as a leading 
example of regulatory convergence. This process underpins attempts by agents within IFCs to create 
But EU regulatory harmonisation was never simply the 
advanced by political actors 
(Macartney, 2011). For example, EU directives initiated as part of the Lamfalussy process aimed at 
deepening the Single Market in financial services elicited different responses from financial interests 
depending on whether they were embedded within the French, German or British national economies 
 a programme 
designed to both deepen and diversify forms of credit provision in the European Single Market  has 
been embraced differential -
- (Quaglia et al., 2016). Divergent political preferences 
between domestic governments, rival fractions of finance capital and supranational actors such as the 
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament have combined to produce contemporary 
patterns of European financial integration (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016). In the relative economic stability 
of the 1990s and 2000s, the political underpinnings of regulatory convergence remained somewhat 
submerged. It is understandable, therefore, why GaWC research did not interrogate the political 
drivers of regulatory convergence in this period. However, as shall be argued below, Brexit reveals 
the political reversibility of these regulatory forms and generates the potential for enhanced 
competition between European IFCs.  
A third and final limitation of GaWC research to date relates to its empirical scope. In analysing 
-eminent 
IFC  the City of London  and other, subordinate, hubs of European finance, such as Frankfurt.  The 
research identified were th
overwhelming comparative advantage over alternative European financial centres. What GaWC 
researchers did not explicitly interrogate was the relation between IFCs on the European continent 
itself. For example, no comparative study of relations between Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Luxembourg 
and Paris has been conducted by GaWC researchers. The prospect of immanent competition between 
these European financial sites was therefore overlooked. In what follows, we shall outline how these 
three   its firm-centrism and corresponding neglect of the political 
embeddedness of IFCs; its tendency to overlook the ways in which regulatory convergence is 
constructed politically; and its omission of relations between European continental financial centres  
have been increasingly problematised by the emerging political economy of Brexit.      
2. The political economy of Brexit and the new geographies of European financial 
centre competition 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, advanced capitalist economies have experienced prolonged deflation, 
low rates of economic growth, a proliferation of precarious work and intensified inequality (Hay & 
Hunt, 2017). Together, these dysfunctions threaten the legitimacy of the global liberal order. Brexit 
-crisis capitalist dysfunction. 
Domestically, Brexit was delivered partly as a result of the protectionist promise to curtail the reach of 
the market, in particular in relation to the free movement of labour (Hopkin, 2017). Internationally, 
the implications of Brexit are far-
has meant the deep integration of spatially proximate regional economies (Hirst et al., 2015). In the 
 as product and labour markets 
became increasingly integrated within the regulatory space of the Single Market (Hay, 2004). As 
GaWC researchers have extensively shown, the City developed a specialised function as a distribution 
hub of financial products into the European Single Market (Taylor et al., 2014, p. 283; see also: 
 2013). The disintegrative tendencies unleashed by Brexit threaten to undermine this dynamic. 
As such, Brexit compels a re-assessment of the assumptions of GaWC research and an engagement 
with the possibility of patterns of competition emerging between rival financial centres. In particular, 
t
 
First, Brexit starkly reveals the political character of European financial integration. This sits uneasily 
with GaWC implicit assumption 
incremental, process of regulatory harmonisation across national borders. The issue of the euro 
clearing trade post-
other European IFCs was only ever a provisional arrangement underpinned by a set of specific 
uro-denominated derivatives are 
cleared within the City of London and this activity is associated with 83,000 jobs in the Square Mile 
(Lavery et al., 2017, p. 
euro-clearing centre demonstrated that the City could complement the business models of alternative 
European IFCs under monetary integration (Faulconbridge, 2004). However, the regulatory 
environment which underpinned this arrangement was always in principle reversible. In 2012, the 
-denominated 
derivatives to inside the eurozone (Howarth & Quaglia, 2013: 115). This was vociferously opposed by 
the UK government and was ultimately struck down by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The 
regulatory and legal context which afforded the City pre-eminence in euro-clearing was therefore 
always politically contingent 
conferred on City-ba
the euro clearing trade is now more vulnerable to relocation. In August 2017, a bloc of MEPs outlined 
plans to tighten-up the rules around euro-denominated clearing, threatening 
to benefit from this lucrative activity (Brunsden, 2017). 
the EU therefore creates a space within which rival political interests within European IFCs can seek 
   
Second, Brexit raises questions regarding the tendency of GaWC research to analytically privilege 
firm relations. It is true, as we note below, that a principal objective of global financial institutions is 
to minimise the disruption caused by Brexit. In that regard, GaWC research still has great potential to 
outline how powerful organise to minimise disruptive regulatory 
divergence. Financial institutions, however, do not operate within a political vacuum. Political actors 
at the international, national and urban scales play a pivotal role in shaping the historical development 
, 2013). 
the role of the state in the (re)production of IFCs demands a shift in the geographical imagination used 
to study financial centres from its current emphasis on networks and relationality to one more 
(Hall, 2017, p. 2). Foregrounding the 
s of urban spaces and national states is particularly important if we are to analyse 
the strategic orientation of political actors in response to the political economy of Brexit. Political 
actors in rival IFCS face quite distinctive incentive structures from the priorities of the private banks 
and financial institutions which they host. As we outline below, the Hesse state government, the 
Frankfurt City authorities, regional marketing agencies and local Landesbanken with business models 
deeply integrated into the surrounding region, have collectively viewed Brexit as an opportunity to 
increase the size of -firm 
relations therefore co-exist with competitive orientations on the part of territorially-rooted state 
officials and business interests. The prospective decoupling  
architecture creates opportunities for these agents  
In the remainder of this article, we analyse the post-Brexit strategic positioning of agents within two 
alternative European IFCs: Frankfurt and Paris. These IFCs were chosen as case studies for a number 
of reasons. Historically, both Frankfurt and Paris 
the dominant global triad of New York, London and Tokyo (Cassis, 2006). Frankfurt has been ranked 
as the second most competitive EU financial centre after the City whilst Paris plays host to the largest 
financial workforce in the eurozone (Lavery et al., 2017).  Furthermore, both Frankfurt and Paris are 
regulatory and supervisory authorities  such as the ECB and EIOPA in Frankfurt and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European Banking Authority (EBA) in Paris.  
For the research, we translated, coded and analysed over 300 documents published between the vote 
The construction of our 
methodological approach is directly informed by our conceptual critique of GaWC research set out 
above. First, our methodology seeks to overcome the firm-centric methodological focus of GaWC by 
considering the strategic positioning of public as well as private actors within Frankfurt and Paris. In 
the case of Frankfurt, we analyse strategy documents, marketing statements and policy reports by the 
Hesse state government and its associated marketing agencies, such as Frankfurt Main Finance and 
Frankfurt-Rhein-Main. This is complemented by empirical analysis of reports and public statements 
by numerous private financial actors, including Deutsche Bank and Helaba. In the case of Paris, we 
reviewed material from various French municipal officials and national politicians, as well as material 
from private financial institutions  and associated 
financial lobby groups. Second, our empirical material seeks to build upon the proposition that Brexit 
exposes the political underpinnings of European financial integration and regulation. As such, our 
of the UK from the EU creates opportunities for political agents within Frankfurt and Paris to 
, for example in relation to euro-denominated clearing. Third, our analysis 
primarily interrogates relations between continental European financial centres, overcoming the 
tendency of GaWC research to focus exclusively on relations between European IFCs and the City of 
London.  
There are, of course, limitations to the way in which this analysis is constructed. It could be suggested 
that the discourse and actions of political elites are epiphenomenal to how firms operate, and thus how 
financial geographies work in practice. In contrast, and in line with Hall (2017), we argue that firms 
do not operate in a political vacuum. The investment decisions of powerful financial actors are shaped, 
if not determined, by the political context of the IFCs within which they are rooted.  Our research is 
also delimited by the reality that at the time of writing the UK had not yet left the EU. Nevertheless, 
our analysis of the period between the June 2016 referendum vote and the March 2017 Article 50 
 captures the early strategic positioning of actors within two prominent European IFCs in the 
immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote. Further empirical research into the evolving competition 
between European IFCs will be necessary as the new UK-EU settlement comes to be established.  
3. Cooperation or Competition? Frankfurt and Paris in the Brexit Conjuncture  
a. Cooperation 
In line with GaWC  focus on complementarity and collaboration between financial centres, our 
documentary analysis suggests that actors within both Frankfurt and Paris widely accept that the City 
. There is no real expectation amongst actors 
in either city that aggressive competitive manoeuvres could alter this fact. This is due to the 
overwhelming competitive advantage of the City, its position as an open hub within global markets as 
well as its long-standing structural advantages over other centres. Furthermore, Frankfurt and Paris 
continue to display a dependence on the City for access to liquidity, clearing, investment funds and 
wholesale banking services.  
Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo, for example, has spoken of the need to facilitate the joint domiciliation of 
companies between the Frankfurt and the City for those firms concerned about the regulatory 
implications of Brexit (Mairie de Paris, 2016). Financial services firms and trade associations have 
also taken a pragmatic st
t
t Paris EUROPLACE, 
, 2017). The chief executive of 
HSBC, which plans to move up to 1,000 staff from the City to Paris, has downplayed the significance 
one to two years, the City of London will have completely 
, 2017). Banking executives in Frankfurt and the Association of 
German Banks (Bundesverband deutscher Banken, BdB) have repeatedly commented that the Hessian 
Michael Kemmer from the BdB stated shortly after the B
to be closely connected with London as a financial location  and warned that a war of the Roses 
would benefit no- elaba stated in November 2016 
basic-
(Helaba, 2016a; 2016b: 8). The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) concluded, in its March 2017 
was, there is no trace of a 
Brexit-exodus. Germany should not delude itself that it can become in a short time the new financial 
Hock, 2017). 
b. Competition 
While the prevailing attitude towards the City of London in Paris and Frankfurt continues to 
between the two continental European 
financial centres is one of increasing competition. Prior to Brexit, Frankfurt and Paris had been 
involved in a contest over which location would establish itself as the predominant IFC on the 
, p. 8). After Brexit, this 
competitive dynamic has accelerated substantially. This is well captured by a Helaba report from June 
2016 which 
sector locations [of Paris and Frankfurt]. The decisive factor here is the relative position of the 
elaba, 2016b
decoupling from the EU and the likely emergence of new regulatory barriers, there is an expectation 
in Paris and Frankfurt that a significant number of global banks will seek to relocate part of their 
operations to the Eurozone. Frankfurt, Paris as well as the other European cities now see themselves 
jobs leaving the City. The prevailing pattern of competition that is emerging, therefore, is not one that 
opposes Frankfurt and Paris with London, but one that pits European IFCs against one another in a 
contest over which can position itself as the best alternative to the City and - as the head of Frankfurt 
Main Finance put it - 
2017, p. 9).  
institutions to leave the City, but if they decide to relocate a part of their activities elsewhere, then our 
message is clear: choose Paris, the only world-
Chaperon, 2017). Marie-
charge of prom
(Chaperon, 2016a). Similarly, the chief economist of Helaba Gertrud Traud has concluded that 
Traud, interviewed in FMF, 2017, p. 
42).  
Actors in Frankfurt 
-de-France 
Regional Council which includes Paris, has argued that Frankfurt remains an undesirable place to live, 
, 2017). Promoters for Frankfurt have, on the other hand, consistently 
emphasise the proximity to European regulators as well as its advantages over Paris in terms of 
infrastructure, labour regulations and property costs (FMF, 2017: 9; Hessischer Ministerium der 
Finanzen, 2017
There is a remarkable similarity in the kind of discourse that is being articulated in the two financial 
locations. A report by EUROPLACE in November 2016, for instance, concluded its assessment of 
vis-a-vis 
attract financial activity leaving the City (Paris EUROPLACE, 2016a). The head of Frankfurt Main 
le-
attract most of those benefits (efinancialcareers, 2017). 
4. Strategy and agency: Frankfurt and Paris 
In this emergent geography of European financial centre competition, distinct and complex patterns of 
behaviour are in evidence in the positioning of private and public actors in Frankfurt and Paris that 
reflect their distinct strategic calculations. These patterns of behaviour are not visible when adopting a 
firm-centric analysis. Instead, it is necessary to take account of the agency of political actors and 
lobby groups operating at the urban and national levels. In both cities, initiatives like Paris 
EUROPLACE and Frankfurt Main Finance have played a prominent role in advocating their 
respective territories. These are public-private organisations that bring together local government, 
regulators and firms. They have functioned as coordinative lobbying hubs for each financial centre as 
well as marketing, research and networking entities. These examples of convergence between firm 
and political interests have however coexisted with examples of divergent behaviour, such that no 
coherent picture of unified action emerges. In turn, this is evidence of the different strategic 
calculations made by firms and political actors. Political actors - which comprise national, regional 
and local government - are mainly concerned to attract firms and jobs in order to increase the taxation 
disruption. This has been most notable in the case of France. There, President Macron and the 
previous Socialist administration under President Hollande have aggressively promoted French 
r major banks have 
shown little interest in Paris as a particular destination for any activities they might seek to relocate 
post-Brexit. In Frankfurt, the divergence has been less stark. The Hesse state government and 
mayoralty have clearly adopted a leading role as advocates of Frankfurt, while global as well as 
national banks have taken a more subordinate position in the promotion of each IFC.  
In order to categorise the strategic positioning of financial and political agents within Frankfurt and 
Paris,  and Brexit 
attempts by local actors 
to identify and attract financial sub-sectors and business activities that have become vulnerable to 
relocation as a consequence of Brexit. This has two elements, relating to how authorities are seeking 
to actively attract vulnerable financial sub-sectors and how they are attempting to respond to the 
potential for regulatory arbitrage in the post-
to secure pro-business regulatory reform at both the national and European levels. 
a. -sectors  
 EU and the 
emergence of new regulatory barriers after Brexit will cause a number of global firms to reconsider 
the location of their European operations. As a result of this moves are being made in both European 
cities to attract as many jobs and businesses as possible. The thinking, as one report from Deutsche 
Bank Research (2016, p. 5-
The report continues, 
in light of the differences between the size of London and Frankfurt London's crumbs could 
Ibidem). This sentiment is clearly reflected in Paris, with Mestrallet 
suggesting that whilst EUROPLACE would not encourage City firms to leave London, the message 
Choose 
 
by Brexit.  
In both Frankfurt and Paris, efforts led by national and local level political actors, operating both 
directly and as part of joint public-private initiatives, have also centred on promoting the two cities as 
desirable locations for financial activity leaving the City. In Frankfurt, local government has been 
particularly active. Ministers from the state government of Hesse have travelled repeatedly to the UK 
heading delegations of state officials as well as business leaders to showcase the advantages of 
attract companies to Germany (Helaba, 2016b), while the German regulator BaFin has organised 
meetings and workshops with representatives of global firms to clarify the procedure to establish 
branches and subsidiaries in Frankfurt (BaFin, 2017). In Paris, there has been marked unity between 
-Brexit 
strategy, the rappo  
de Montgolfier, 2017, 
p. 71).  has also been particularly active in this period, vaunting the merits of Paris as an 
alternative IFC in a letter to 4,000 potential investors in London just days after the Brexit vote. There 
has, moreover, been overlap with those groups representing French financial firms, with numerous 
forums and international trips organised through Paris EUROPLACE attended and supported by 
leading government figures, including then-Prime Minister Manuel Valls and President Macron. 
The efforts of these political actors in both Frankfurt and Paris have centred around four sub-sectors 
which are perceived to be particularly liable to relocation after Brexit. The first of these is the 
lucrative business of clearing euro-denominated derivatives, which is concentrated in the hands of a 
small number of counterparty clearing houses. As mentioned before, the future ability of the City of 
London to clear these financial products has been thrown into question by Brexit and is currently 
being reconsidered by the European Commission and the ECB. For this reason, clearing is identified 
both in France and Germany as a key area where jobs and trade could move to the continent 
(Deutsche Bank Research, 2016, p. 4). France has been particularly active on this front, with the 
national government taking a particularly strong position. In December 2016, French government 
officials pushed for restrictions on euro-clearing in the City to be included in legislative proposals 
scheduled to take place in mid-2017 (see Barker & Brunsden, 2016). President Hollande and the 
governor of the Banque de France
London should no longer be allowed to host euro- , 2016a). 
well- -largest asset management centre after the City, and Paris 
sectors for which Place de Paris 
(AFG) stated that although 
asset management industry to capitalise (Gestion de Fortune 2016). Although it is disadvantaged due 
to its traditionally risk-adverse and already highly consolidated domestic market, Frankfurt is also 
expecting to make some gains (IMF, 2016; FMF, 2017). Already the third largest market in the EU 
for asset management, the city is estimating, according to the head of FMF, that this will form one of 
ng to Frankfurt (efinancecareers, 2017). 
Thirdly, there has been activity from within both IFCs to position themselves as the ideal location for 
the new seat of the European Banking Authority (EBA) (Deutsche Bank Research, 2016). Frankfurt 
emphasised the presence of its existing regulatory authorities and highlighted the benefits of 
concentrating these institutions in one place. The chief economist at Helaba, for instance, has declared 
stined as the location of the EBA, 
which will be unable to remain in London post-
(Traud, quoted in FMF, 2017, p. 44). Paris, on the other hand, emphasised the need to ensure a more 
ultimately 
successful bid to host the relocated EBA, Hollande argued in direct reference to Frankfurt, that such a 
-Meyer, 
2017).  
Finally, FinTech has emerged as a key sector that actors within both IFCs are keen to attract post-
Brexit. In Paris, FinTech is seen as a key growth industry from which the city can benefit 
significantly, with both Paris EUROPLACE (2016a) and the Senate report (de Montgolfier, 2017) 
highlighting the sector as a key target. In January 2017, then-Secretary of State for Digital Affairs, 
Axelle Lemaire, argued that France is well-positioned to attract FinTech firms for a number of 
reasons, including the loosening of regulatory administration under schemes such as AGiLITY and 
-square meter 
Station F in Paris (Cook, 2017; BI Intelligence, 2017). Although Frankfurt has to deal with internal 
competi
-ups through incubators, accelerators 
and specific tax benefits (FMF, 2017, p. 22-23). In November 2016, the Ministry of the Economy for 
the state of Hesse inaugurated the TechQuartier - a new business centre for FinTech start-ups - and 
Ibidem). A recent report from EY (2017b, 
p. 73) wing to its continuously and rapidly developing FinTech ecosystem, Germany 
 
b.  
Brexit also creates the possibility of competitive regulatory arbitrage between rival financial centres. 
Regulatory arbitrage refers to attempts by financial and political authorities to induce external 
regulatory standards.  The majority of EU capital 
Regulation Authority (PRA)
is a high probability that large investment banks, private equity firms and venture capital funds will 
relocate some of their business activities to inside the Single Market. However, this creates an 
opportunity for supervisory authorities - located at the member state level - to laxly enforce EU 
regulation in order to induce external investment. For example, in March 2017 the Irish finance 
minister Eoghan Murphy lodged a complaint with the Commission against Luxembourg on the 
grounds that it had engaged in regulatory arbitrage in order to secure post-Brexit investment from the 
insurer AIG (Boland et al., 2017). Taking advantage of divergent supervisory standards therefore 
represents one area where agents within EU financial centres can seek to secure a competitive 
advantage over their rivals.  
Actors within Frankfurt and Paris have been sensitive to this emerging competitive threat. The 
regulation to be maintained in the EU after Brexit, and has put pressure on the Federal government to 
-
particular, they have highlighted Dutch plans to soften the limits on bonuses for bankers (Smolka et 
al., 
-Frank act, as indicators of a global deregulatory race which 
Germany must seek to minimise. The BdB has 
 
Similarly, actors in Paris have sought to initiate a series of supervisory reforms, which can be seen as 
a defensive move aimed at limiting the capacity of other financial centres to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage. Parisian authorities view arbitrage both as a potential threat to the stability of the European 
created the risk that companies, particularly in the field of asset management, might circumvent the 
 
regimes, citing Luxembourg specifically (de Montgolfier, 2017, p. 
market regulator, the  des M Financiers (AMF), has 
backed calls to give more powers to ESMA and has proposed more integrated European supervision 
(cited in Chaperon, 2017; Mooney & Thompson, 
- hened up European regulatory regime would limit the ability of 
Mooney & Thompson, ublic 
competitive position vis- -vis other financial centres by seeking to bolster the strength of EU 
regulation and supervisory enforcement. 
c.  
Our analysis also reveals how some actors have sought to utilise Brexit as 
to advance pro-business reforms. This can be seen in attempts to strengthen the competitive
through programmes designed to lower taxation 
and soften labour market regulation. In the first instance, we see a defensive baseline position taken 
by actors in Frankfurt and Paris with regards to the European financial regulatory environment, aimed 
at minimising the establishment of any further competitive disadvantages. In Frankfurt, for instance, 
the Ministry of Finance for the state of Hesse has called in April 2017 for the domestic financial 
se -
Ministerium der Finanzen, 2017a). This defensive positioning has been integrated in a select number 
of instances by calls for the loosening of domestic regulations. In the most prominent of these cases, 
the BdB and the state government of Hesse have mounted a concerted effort on the federal 
government, pressuring it to weaken labour regulations on firing high-earning staff (Smolka et al., 
2017; Hessischer Ministerium der Finanzen, 2017b).  
2017 elections to put pressure on the outgoing Socialist government and the new presidential 
candidates, with Mestrallet calling 
d 
Bodescot, 2016). At a hearing in front the Senate Finance Committee, representatives of the financial 
industry sent a clear message that the cost and flexibility of labour would be the only determinants of 
relocation decisions between Paris and rival financial centres (see Couet, 2017). In a high-profile 
interview in Le Figaro newspaper, Jean-
on the taxation of banking activities, corporate tax and perso
government had already announced (Bayart, 
clear message on banking and 
, 2016b). Indeed, this pressure to bring 
about liberalising reform was felt at the top level of government, with the then-Finance Minister 
, 
2016b). 
Conclusion 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a marked reconfiguration within the global political 
economy. New forms of anti-systemic politics have also emerged in this conjuncture, threatening the 
institutions and organisational principles of the global liberal order. Brexit embodies one localised 
process of global restructuring. Brexit effectively 
But this process does not impact upon all agents equitably. 
 on the disruptive effects of Brexit. This article has traced the ways in 
which agents within two important European financial centres - Frankfurt and Paris - have adopted 
new competitive orientations designed to privilege their territories in the aftermath of the 
referendum to leave the EU.     
GaWC research represents the landmark attempt within economic geography to empirically 
relations between European financial centres in the period prior to the 2008 crisis. GaWC research 
correctly identified numerous instances of intra-firm within financial . 
The series of GaWC case studies of Frankfurt-London relations undertaken in the early 2000s are 
European monetary integration. Despite these strengths, we have argued that GaWC research contains 
a number of blind spots which limit its explanatory potential in the present conjuncture. GaWC 
research tends to adopt a firm-centric approach and thereby neglects 
rival IFCs. It overlooks the ways in which transnational regulatory harmonisation is underpinned by 
politics and therefore is ill-suited to charting the ways in which regulatory divergence creates political 
opportunities for actors within IFCs. GaWC research has not to date investigated empirically relations 
between continental European financial centres and so misses the immanent potential for competition 
between these sites.  In order to adequately account for emergent patterns of competition between 
European IFCs, we have argued that the strategic positioning of political actors should be placed at 
 
As our empirical material demonstrates, Brexit generates new competitive orientations between 
Frankfurt and Paris.  The City  position as a centre of euro clearing was always dependent 
-
opportunity for agents within European IFCs to take advantage of divergent supervisory arrangements 
at the member state level in order to induce international investment into their territories. Competitive 
re-orientations - codified through law, regulation and domestic politics - are therefore in evidence in 
the post-Brexit context. In this uncertain and fractious terrain, sensitivity to the strategic orientation of 
political agents within IFCs is crucial.  
Our case studies of Frankfurt and Paris demonstrate that the City of London is unlikely to lose its 
-
GaWC research, remain powerful. Nonetheless, this should not obscure important reconfigurations 
within rival European IFCs. Political agents within Frankfurt and Paris have adopted a competitive 
the EU. Our analysis inductively identifies two broad strategic reorientations of agents within 
Frankfurt and Paris after the Brexit vote
tory bodies and 
Fintech have all been identified as vulnerable sub-sectors which political agents within Frankfurt and 
Paris now seek to attract.  emerged as rival centres 
threaten to laxly enforce supervisory regimes in order to induce external investment.  Second
constellations of private sector lobbyists and public agencies  such as Paris Europlace and Frankfurt 
Main Finance  seek to d
secure pro-finance reforms both domestically and at the EU level. In isolation, a firm-centric 
methodology can lead us to miss these important political reconfigurations. Private financial 
-exist with political agents  most notably politicians at 
the urban, national and European scales  who respond to quite distinct incentive structures and 
political pressures. Whilst private EU banking 
City in order to sustain their business models, political actors are often driven to augment their 
financial sector employment and tax base. As the political economy of Brexit unfolds and the 
in which the disintegrative Brexit process generates new geographies of European financial 
competition and power. 
  





  
  
1 We recognise, moreover, that the study of world cities in the GaWC research network has developed in many different 
directions. Some scholars, such as Taylor, Derudder and their collaborators, have focused their efforts on constructing 
models of quantitative analysis through which to map the networks between world cities. Others, such as Watson & 
Beaverstock (2014), emphasise instead the need for more qualitative and case study-based scholarship. While we cannot do 
justice to the wealth of contributions and debates that are taking place in the GaWC research area, we wish here to direct the 
discussion to a broader set of assumptions and blind spots that characterise and constrain GaWC research as a whole. We 
believe that giving proper consideration to these unseen areas is crucial if GaWC is to retain the ability to explain the present 
global conjuncture.  
2 
state in the construction and repr
(Bassens & Van 
Meeteren, 2015, p. 767). In this paper we seek to engage constructively with this call. 
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